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errors by the reporter in the transcription of my [the witness']
testimony." The court held that while it is permissible for a
witness to make changes on a deposition before signing it, he
must give "the reason therefor-either that it is an incorrect
transcript or that his present recollection of the facts is more
accurate-and he may then state what his corrected answer is
and give any other explanation he desires with respect to his prior
answer."
It has been the established procedure to permit a witness to
make any changes in a deposition before signing it.2 06 However,
an omnibus statement as to the reason for correction will not be
sufficient under the CPLR, whatever its acceptance was under
the CPA. Rather, the transcript of the testimony should indicate
what the original testimony was, what the corrected testimony
is, and finally, whether the corrections are due to a challenge to
the stenographer's accuracy or a desire on the part of the
witness to change his testimony. There is prior case law to just
that effect. 20 7 The reason for this requirement of specificity is
obvious-if the accuracy of the stenographer is challenged, the
party taking the deposition will put the stenographer on the
witness stand to testify that he took the statement accurately 20s
and thereby raise a question of credibility. In addition, this
procedure will enable the trial court to compare the original form
of the answer with the corrected answer to determine which
one should be credited. 209
ACCELERATED JUDGUtENT

Objection to Jurisdiction Raised in the Answer -Getting

an

Early Disposition
In Kukoda v. Schneider,21 0 a personal injury action, defendant
objected to the court's jurisdiction by way of an affirmative defense
in his answer, a CPLR procedure unknown to the CPA. Plaintiff
then moved to dismiss the affirmative defense on the ground that
no defense was stated.211 The court held that although the
206E.g., Skeaney v. Silver Beach Realty Corp., 10 App. Div. 2d 537,
201 N.Y.S.2d 163 (1st Dep't 1960); Columbia v. Lee, 239 App. Div. 849,
264 N.Y. Supp. 423 (2d Dep't 1933); Gottfried v. Gottfried, 197 Misc.
562, 95 N.Y.S.2d 561 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Hayes v. City of N.Y., 98 N.Y.S.2d
424 (Sup. Ct. 1950); American Worcestershire Sauce Co. v. Armour & Co.,
194 Misc. 745, 87 N.Y.S.2d 738 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
207 Mansbach v. Klausner, 179 Misc. 952, 40 N.Y.S.2d 647 (Sup. Ct.
1943).
2 8
0 Id. at 953, 40 N.Y.S.2d at 648.
209 Columbia v. Lee, supra note 206, at 850, 264 N.Y. Supp. at 424.
21041 Misc. 2d 308, 245 N.Y.S.2d 271 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
21
CPLR R. 3211(b).
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CPLR has made no express provision for the immediate determination of a jurisdictional objection when raised by the defendant in his answer rather than by motion, an immediate determination was obviously necessary to avoid prejudice to the
plaintiff by compelling him to wait until the trial for its adjudication.
If the CPLR did not permit early disposition of such a defense,
the plaintiff would be confronted with serious statute of limitations
problems, as will be treated shortly.
The problem in Kukoda would not have arisen had the defendant raised his objection by motion, which he also has a right
to do. 212 The issue, then, would have been before the court
immediately. Affidavits may be submitted on the motion. 213 Rule
3211(c) expressly provides for that, and further provides that
such evidence may consist of any materials that may properly
be considered by the court on a motion for summary judgment.
The court may even treat the motion, which is made under rule
3211, as one for summary judgment or, if a triable issue of
fact exists, the court is empowered to order an immediate trial
of such issue. The latter procedure, provided for by rule 3211(c),
differs from that on a motion for summary judgment, where the
court must deny the motion if it appears that there is a genuine
factual dispute requiring a trial. 214 Rule 3211(c) thus affords
the tools requisite to an accelerated determination of a defense
based on lack of jurisdiction even though the relevant facts be in
dispute.
In view of the congested court calendars, especially in negligence cases, the court's determination in Kukoda enables a plaintiff to avoid the substantial prejudice which would necessarily
result to him if he were compelled to wait for a number of years
21
before the jurisdictional question would be decided at the trial. 5
The prejudice relates chiefly to the statute of limitations. If the
jurisdictional point could not be resolved until the trial, and the
trial was years away, the sustaining of the objection at the trial
would find the plaintiff barred from commencing a new action
on the same cause because the statute of limitations would usually
have expired. There is no extension of the statute of limitations
under Section 205 of the CPLR, relating to the termination of
a prior action, when such prior action was dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction of the defendant's person.2 16 That is most important
212 The defendant may raise his jurisdiction objection by motion or answer.
CPLR Rr. 320(b), (c) ; 3211(a) (8)-(9), (e).
213
214
215

CPLR R. 3211(c).
CPLR R. 3212(b).
See Zedick v. Anderson, (Sup. Ct. Bronx County), 151 N.Y.L.., April

3, 1964, p. 13, col. 8.

216 Knox v. Beckford, 258 App. Div. 823, 15 N.Y.S.2d 174 (3d Dep't 1939),
aff'd, 285 N.Y. 762, 34 N.E.2d 911 (1941). See Smalley v. Hutcheon, 296
N.Y. 68, 70 N.E.2d 161 (1946).
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to note because the no-extension rule appears not in the text
of section 205, but in judicial interpolation. And even if the
original period of limitations is still alive, so that the plaintiff
does not require a section 205 extension, he would still suffer
prejudice, e.g., the loss of witnesses or their failure to recollect.
In another recent case, Vazzano v. Horn,2 17 the court held
that although the Revisers did not anticipate that rule 3211(b)
would be used to dispose of a dispute over service, the motion
must be held to lie in order to avoid the consequence of the long
delay that would result if the objection, taken by answer rather
than by motion at the defendant's option, were not reached until
trial.
Note also that the court permits affidavits and other proof
on the motion, which means, very simply, that the defense need
not (despite the language of rule 3211(b), which might be construed to the contrary) be defective on its face. Thus, rule
3211(b) may test the factual or evidentiary basis, as well as
the legal bases, -of the defense or claim.218 This case resolves
one of the most serious dilemmas initially posed by the CPLR.
Motion to Dismiss for Nonjoinder of an Indispensable Party
In Polar Distribs., Inc. v. Granger Realty Corp.,219 which
involved an action to foreclose a mechanic's lien, defendant moved
to dismiss the complaint on the ground, inter alia, that the court
should not proceed in the absence of a person who should have
been made a party.220 The court denied defendant's motion and
held that before a motion to dismiss for nonjoinder of an indispensable party pursuant to Rule 3211(a) (10) of the CPLR
may be granted, it is a condition precedent that the defendant
make a prior motion to have the indispensable party joined in
the action.
Under prior practice a motion to dismiss the complaint for
nonjoinder could not be made in the first instance. 22'
Two
motions were necessary. Defendant had to move, first, for an
order directing theoplaintiff to join the omitted party within a
specified time and if such order was not complied with, he might
afterwards move, second, to dismiss the complaint.222 It was
2 17

Vazzano v. Horn, (Sup. Ct Kings County), 151 N.Y.L.J., Feb. 19,

1964, p. 19, col. 1.

218 4 WmNsTEN, KoRN & Mnum, NEw Yopm CrvIm PRAccrEcf13211.01,
3211.46 (1964).
219 (Sup. Ct. Queens County), 151 N.Y.L.J., Feb. 21, 1964, p. 20, col. 1.
220 CPLR R. 3211(a) (10).
221RCP 102; CPA §§ 192-93.
222Wolff v. Brontown Realty Corp., 281 App. Div. 752, 118 N.Y.S.2d 74
(2d Dep't 1953); Marisco v. Tramutolo, 135 N.Y.S.2d 258 (Sup. Ct. 1954);

Marrero v. Levitt, 152 N.Y.S.2d 802 (Munic. Ct. 1956).

